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Non-technical summary
In a constantly changing economic environment a country’s ability to undertake reforms
is crucial to maintain economic growth and to promote the welfare of its citizens. It is
therefore vital to understand the factors which determine policy reforms. Empirical stud-
ies have brought forward several potential factors which influence the implementation of
reforms. Among these factors are economic conditions like crises, the budgetary situation
and the state of economic affairs in neighboring countries. Yet there is virtually no re-
search on the influence of behavioral measures like trust on reforms.
We investigate the impact of trust on reforms and argue that in high-trust environments
it is easier to agree on (in the long run) welfare enhancing reforms. Among the theoretical
arguments which lead to this conclusion are the reduction of information deficits due to
a higher level of information attained by individuals in high-trust societies, the modera-
tion of conflicts regarding the wealth distribution in environments of high trust, and the
possibility to make credible promises for compensation of reform losers.
The relationship is investigated empirically using robust regression techniques for a cross-
section of countries. Answers to the World Values survey question ”Generally speaking,
would you say that most people can be trusted [...]” serve as our trust measure. Reforms
are quantified by means of Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World indicator.
We refine our arguments along the policy dimensions included in that reform proxy (size of
government, legal structure, sound money, freedom to trade, regulation). Various control
variables like a proxy for the state of development and the initial level of the Economic
Freedom indicator are included.
We find a significant positive relation between trust and reforms with regard to govern-
ment size, the legal system, and deregulation of private businesses and the labor market.
Results on the impact of trust on reforms in the trade sector and the monetary system
are inconclusive. Several robustness test both with regard to the time period under con-
sideration and the estimation technique indicate the stability of our results. The reform
measures are further decomposed to identify which submeasures are particularly influ-
enced by trust.
The results suggest that (i) trust fosters the evolution of institutions which give peo-
ple the opportunity to be responsive to governmental activity through a respected legal
framework, (ii) pushes back the influence of regulatory frameworks in the labor market
and regulations of private businesses, and (iii) decreases governmental involvement in the
private economy.
Summing up, our theoretical reasoning and this first explicit test for a link between trust
and reforms support the view that trust is conducive for reforms. Yet, there is need for
further research. Complementary to approaches based on macro data disaggregated data
on a micro level might provide further insights into some of the mentioned channels from
trust to reform acceptance.
Das Wichtigste in Ku¨rze
Die Reformfa¨higkeit von Nationalstaaten bestimmt u¨ber Erfolg und Misserfolg in einem
sich sta¨ndig wandelnden o¨konomischen Umfeld. Die Determinanten der Reformfa¨higkeit
sind daher von großem Interesse fu¨r die Erhaltung und Fo¨rderung von Wachstum und
Wohlstand. Diverse empirische Studien untersuchten diese Faktoren und fanden verschie-
dene potentielle Reformdeterminanten. Darunter sind o¨konomische Faktoren wie Krisen,
die Budgetsituation und die o¨konomischen Bedingungen in Nachbarla¨ndern. Jedoch sind
Studien zum Zusammenhang zwischen verhaltenso¨konomischen Gro¨ßen wie Vertrauen und
Reformen rar.
Dieses Papier untersucht die Beziehung zwischen Vertrauen und Reformen. Zentrale Hy-
pothese ist, dass es in La¨ndern mit ausgepra¨gtem Vertrauen unter den Bu¨rgern leichter
ist, sich auf langfristig die Wohlfahrt steigernde Reformen zu einigen. Verschiedene Argu-
mente sprechen fu¨r diese Hypothese. So sind Bu¨rger in La¨ndern mit ho¨herem Vertrauen in
der Regel besser informiert u¨ber politische Prozesse, was die Durchfu¨hrung von Reformen
vereinfacht. Weiterhin ist zu erwarten, dass Reformen seltener an nicht glaubwu¨rdigen
Kompensationsversprechen an potentielle Reformverlierer scheitern und Verteilungskon-
flikte leichter aufgelo¨st werden ko¨nnen.
Die empirische Untersuchung des Zusammenhanges in einem La¨nderquerschnitt erfolgt
mittels robuster Regressionsverfahren. Reaktionen auf die Frage des World Values Survey
”
Glauben Sie, dass man den meisten Menschen vertrauen kann [...]“ dienen als Vertrau-
ensmaß. Reformen werden quantifiziert mittels des Economic Freedom of the World In-
dikators (Fraser Institute). Verschiedene Kontrollvariablen wie ein Maß fu¨r den aktuellen
Entwicklungsstand und das Anfangslevel des Economic Freedom Indikators werden ein-
bezogen.
Ergebnis der empirischen Untersuchung ist ein statistisch signifikant positiver Zusammen-
hang zwischen Vertrauen und Reformen in Bezug auf die Gro¨ße des o¨ffentlichen Sektors
und des Rechtssystems. Weiterhin fu¨hrt Vertrauen nach dieser Analyse zu Deregulierun-
gen am Arbeitsmarkt und zu Deregulierungen in Bezug auf private Unternehmen. Kein
direkter Zusammenhang hingegen ist zwischen Vertrauen und Reformen im Handelssek-
tor und im moneta¨ren Sektor zu beobachten. Verschiedene Robustheitstests besta¨tigen
die Stabilita¨t der Resultate.
Die Beobachtungen legen nahe, dass Vertrauen (i) die Entwicklung von Institutionen
fo¨rdert, welche den Bu¨rgern die Mo¨glichkeit geben, auf das Handeln der Regierung inner-
halb eines rechtlich anerkannten Rahmens zu reagieren, (ii) Regulierungen zuru¨ckdra¨ngt
und (iii) den Einfluss des Staates auf den Wirtschaftsprozess verringert.
Insgesamt zeigt die theoretische Ero¨rterung zusammen mit diesem ersten empirischen
Test, dass Vertrauen fo¨rderlich ist fu¨r die Durchfu¨hrung von Reformen. Komplementa¨r zu
diesem Makroansatz sind weitere Studien wu¨nschenswert, welche auf Basis disaggregierter
Daten die im Einzelnen genannten Zusammenha¨nge untersuchen.
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Abstract
In a constantly changing economic environment a country’s ability to undertake
institutional reforms is crucial to maintain economic growth and to promote the
welfare of its citizens. A wide range of determinants for institutional reforms have
been identified. However, the impact of trust on reforms has so far never been ad-
dressed. We provide theoretical arguments why trust should influence institutional
changes and test the relationship empirically. We find a significant positive relation
between trust and reforms with regard to government size, the legal system, and
deregulation of private businesses and the labor market. The results in other policy
fields are ambiguous.
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1 Introduction1
In an environment characterized by increasing global economic integration and demo-
graphic changes it is crucial for countries to undertake institutional reforms in order to
maintain economic growth and to promote the welfare of their citizens. In recent years a
series of empirical analyses have been undertaken to identify the factors that empirically
determine a country’s ability to reform. Although a wide range of potential reform deter-
minants have been examined, there was virtually no emphasize on measures of trust. The
aim of this paper is to fill the gap and to explore the impact of trust on institutional re-
forms. We find that trust facilitates institutional reforms with regard to the legal system,
involvement of the government in the private economy, and deregulation of labor markets
and private businesses. However, the results on the impact of trust on reforms with regard
to international trade and the monetary system are inconclusive. The paper is organized
as follows. In section 2 we explore the theoretical and current empirical literature on
reform determinants. The channels through which trust possibly influences institutional
changes are explained in chapter 3. We derive empirically testable hypotheses and proceed
to test these hypotheses using robust regression techniques for a cross-section of countries.
Section 4 summarizes and concludes.
2 Theoretical and Empirical results on the political
economy of structural reforms
In recent years a wide range of theoretical and empirical results with respect to the polit-
ical economy of reforms have been accumulated. According to Haggard and Williamson
(1994), we distinguish four clusters of hypotheses relevant for institutional changes. The
first cluster comprises the overall economic conditions which incorporate amongst others
economic crises, economic stability and external factors like the state of economic affairs
in neighboring countries. A second cluster consists of several political conditions, like po-
litical competition, position of the incumbent government on the political spectrum and
social consensus. The internal organization of the policy-making apparatus is covered in
a third cluster. Finally, the nature of the reform itself and the implementation and com-
munication strategy are important matters and comprise the last cluster. In exploring
the literature, we focus on economic and political conditions for institutional changes.
Olson (1982) was one of the first addressing the relevance of economic conditions for re-
forms by arguing that societies have a natural tendency to become sclerotic. Over time
1The authors would like to thank Ivo Bischoff, Christian Bjørnskov, Hans Pitlik, Lars Siemers and
participants of the 2008 Annual Meeting of the European Public Choice Society for useful comments and
suggestions.
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and given there is no major crises, the influence of interest groups on policymakers be-
comes stronger and flexibility of the economic system declines. This in turn promotes
economic crises, since necessary adjustments of the institutional setting are delayed or
do not occur at all. He then argues that crises provide a window of opportunity for
far-reaching policy reforms, since in crises-like situations, people agree that reforms are
necessary and a consensus for institutional changes can be established. The main diffi-
culties in the empirical analysis of this hypothesis are the choice of the appropriate crisis
measure and the definition of what constitutes a crisis. Pitlik and Wirth (2003) conduct
a panel analysis using inflation and growth measures as crisis indicators and find that
crises are indeed conducive to reforms.
The budget situation is considered as another economic determinant of reforms and is
analyzed by Helbing et al. (2004). The authors focus exclusively on the experiences of
industrialized countries. They find evidence that an opportune budget situation supports
deregulatory steps on labor and product markets as well as trade liberalization. For this
link, a variety of possible explanations are provided: The enforceability of deregulatory
steps may depend on the ability of a government to compensate the losers of such a reform
which in turn depends on the budget situation. Alternatively, the correlation of structural
reforms and an opportune budget could mirror the existence of limited political capital
(i.e. a limited consent of the population, reputation or ability to deal with conflicts). In
this case, a government can only enforce structural reforms if it is not forced to implement
unpopular measures of budget consolidation at the same time.
The relation between the budgetary situation and structural reforms in industrialized
countries is further analyzed by Heinemann (2007). The results do show that the fiscal
situation not necessarily needs to worsen, possibly due to compensation promises, in the
course of a reform process. Quite in contrary, there is empirical evidence that the simul-
taneous liberalization of goods and products markets have relieving effects on budget. A
budgetary worsening may rather be observed with reforms of the tax system and also
partially with labor market reforms.
Abiad and Mody (2005) analyze reform processes in the field of financial market deregu-
lation. The indicators used take account for - among other factors - interest rate controls,
market entry barriers, the extent of state ownership of banks and insurance companies
as well as restrictions on international financial transactions. According to the subject,
specific control variables such as the occurrences of bank-crises and the international inter-
est rate level play a role as possible determinants. Furthermore regional diffusion effects
are included in the model which could as well be of interest for other fields of reforms.
Regional diffusion is accounted for by including the level of regulation of neighbouring
countries. Then, it can be verified in how far imitation and diffusion effects across bor-
ders are of importance. Indeed, the study shows that regional diffusion effects influence
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reform and deregulation processes. The authors although stress the relevance of learning
processes: typically deregulation processes accelerate after the first cautious steps. This
indicates that first positive experiences with financial market deregulations increase the
enforceability of further steps, which is a relevant aspect with regard to the appropriate
reform implementation strategy.
Heckelman and Knack (2005) look at external economic factors and are particularly inter-
ested in effects of development aid payments on reforms. Therefore, their panel study is
limited to developing countries. According to this study, development aid payments have
a negative impact on the extent of reforms. However, increasing civil rights have positive
effects. Thus democratic, developing countries are rather reform oriented than autocratic
countries.
In contrast to the other presented studies, Heinemann (2004) also includes control vari-
ables on educational level of the population (media availability, school attendance). As
a result, school attendance has significant positive influence on reforms concerning the
public sector, but not so on other reform-subindicators.
Duval and Elmeskov (2005) are mainly interested in the question whether the European
Monetary Union has made structural reforms of the members easier or harder. They come
to a cautious negative conclusion because their regression analysis for monetary auton-
omy, at least for large countries, shows a positive correlation with the speed of structural
reforms. To some extent Belke et al. (2005) take an opposing position. They also ana-
lyzed the role of the exchange rate regime and diagnosed a negative influence of exchange
rate flexibility on structural reforms as well as reforms of the financial sector and the
monetary system.
Relevant hypotheses with regard to the political conditions for reforms are collected by
Haggard and Williamson (1994). They explain that political competition, measured for
example by the share of seats of each party in the parliament, increases the likelihood
for reforms, since governmental entities must be more responsive to voters demands.
Moreover the authors argue that long-run reforms require, if not consensus, at least a
substantial body of public support. Social consensus in turn can be achieved through
trust, as we will explain later.
Summing up the literature, a couple of very robust empirical results of the various studies
can be found. To begin with, the crisis-hypothesis can be viewed as to have a reliable
empiric foundation: Throughout reforms are more enforceable if certain indicators such
as the economic growth rate, the unemployment rate, fiscal data or exchange rates signal
an economic crises. The TINA-argument (”there is no alternative”) then seems to pave
the way for reforms unacceptable in more prosperous times. The readiness to question
the status quo might be due to the increasing perception of the unavoidability of reforms
which is connected with increasing cognitive dissonances. Apparently these psychological
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mechanisms support the enforcement of reforms in times of crises.
Another robust result is that the initial situation matters. Countries which are in a back-
ward position have a higher probability for reforms to be enforced than countries which
already have high levels of liberalization.
Moreover, the empirical evidence that reform processes in adjacent or important reference
countries have a positive impact on reforms within a country is convincing. Thus interna-
tional experiences have cross border effects and can regularly pave the way for overcoming
a countries’ internal resistance towards reforms.
3 The impact of trust on reforms
3.1 Why should trust matter?
Trust is involved in virtually every economic interaction. We have to trust employers, em-
ployees, lawyers, teachers, train operators, airlines, the government, our fellow citizens,
and so forth. Trust is especially important in interactions which are not backed by a
formal contract, because then it is crucial for the parties involved in the interaction that
their counterparts follow the (non-formal) contract. There is no device of punishment if
one party does not collaborate. However, trust is relevant in interactions based on a for-
mal contract as well. There are always leeways for the parties to engage in actions which
may be unfavorable for their counterparts, because a formal contract never can capture all
possible aspects of the interaction. According to Arrow (1972, p. 357),”Virtually every
commercial transaction has within itself an element of trust, certainly any transaction
conducted over a period of time. It can be plausibly argued that much of the economic
backwardness in the world can be explained by the lack of mutual confidence.”
Over the years a broad literature on the implications of trust has developed. There
is evidence that trust is important for growth (Putnam 1993, Knack and Keefer 1997,
Bengtsson, Berggren and Jordahl 2005) but also for lowering transaction costs in inter-
national trade (den Butter and Mosch 2003), democratic stability (Uslaner 2003) and
political and civic involvement (Knack and Keefer 1997).
Several channels trough which trust affects aggregate economic performance are provided
by Knack and Keefer (1997). According to them, in high-trust societies individuals need
to spend less time and money on protection against exploitation arising from economic
interactions. Furthermore a wide range of interactions do not need to be specified in a
formal contract and can instead be based on trust, which is less costly than a written
contract. In addition, societies with a high level of trust are less dependent on formal
institutions. If no formal institution exists, interpersonal trust can step in to facilitate
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enforcement of contracts. With regard to the trustworthiness of governments, the authors
argue that in high-trust societies government officials are perceived as more trustworthy
and hence their policy actions are more credible. From the perspective of the government,
high trust induces lower cost to monitor and control whether citizens obey the law or not.
Therefore, trust plays a key role in facilitating the initiation of contracts and lowers the
enforcement costs of those contracts, which in turn stimulates economic performance.
In addition to the direct influence on economic performance, trust affects performance
indirectly through political channels. Knack (2002) identifies two broad channels through
which trust and social capital can lead to better government performance. According to
him, social capital increases governmental accountability such that government must be
responsive to citizens in general rather than to narrow interest groups. Moreover, so-
cial capital can promote agreements when preferences are polarized in society. Bjørnskov
(2007) finds that both the supply of honest politicians and bureaucrats as well as the
broader political responsiveness to voters preferences in high trust societies lead to better
governance. An environment of trust enhances the information acquisition of voters about
the political process, as was shown by Boix and Posner (1998). Putnam (1993) argues
that trust facilitates cooperation among individuals, fosters solidarity and enhances so-
cial behavior such that people do not only pursue there own interest, but take care of the
interest and needs of others.
Therefore, one can plausibly argue that in high-trust environments it is easier to agree
on welfare enhancing reforms and hence countries with a high level of trust should be
able to adjust their institutional setting faster to a changing economic environment than
countries with low trust levels. However, despite its importance, the issue so far was not
explicitly addressed in the empirical reform literature.
To clarify the relation between trust and reforms, we provide the following theoretical
arguments which explain the causes of reform deadlocks and illustrate how trust can help
to overcome those deadlocks.
First, insufficient information and incorrect perceptions about outcomes of reform pro-
cesses may conserve the status quo. Caplan (2002) argues, that economists and non-
economist differ strongly in their assessment of issues concerning the economy. Whereas
economic globalization is perceived as beneficial in the long run by economist, this view
is not shared by the wider population. Hence, if politicians base their decisions on expert
insights, they may be confronted with a different assessment by the population. In order
to facilitate reforms, it is therefore crucial to convince people of the expert assessment
of the situation. Related to this argument is the observation that reforms often show
a J-curve effect, that is, the policy change is only beneficial in the long run and may
involve costs in the short run. If this is the case the acceptance of reforms depends on a
government’s ability to convince citizens that the benefits of the reform will evolve over
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time and will in the end outweigh the initial costs.
Second, actions of interest groups which would loose their privileges with a reform could
conserve the status quo, even if the reform would be welfare enhancing in the aggregate.
Alesina and Drazen (1991) model the resistance of interest groups to specific reforms as
a war of attrition: Because no interest group wants to forsake its privileges in the status
quo, each group waits until others do the first step. Consequently, every group waits and
reforms are delayed. This is the case even when all groups would be better of after reforms
in the aggregate.
Third, the resistance of individuals which are worse off after the reform is a noteworthy
factor. Those individuals would only vote in favor of a particular reform, if they are to
some degree altruistic or if a credible promise for compensation is made. Rodrik (1998)
shows, that countries with a higher degree of openness to trade have on average higher
government spending. It is argued that a higher degree of openness induces a higher
exposure to external risk and government spending acts as a risk-reducing instrument.
This external risk may in turn lead, among other factors, to higher risk of unemployment.
Therefore, citizens are compensated by higher government spending if they are exposed to
such external risk. The promise of compensation can, however, only then smooth reform
processes if it is credible ex ante.
Fourth, uncertainty about the individual consequences of particular reforms might impede
policy changes. Even reforms which are welfare enhancing could fail because individuals
are uncertain about their gains and losses. This is the case if individuals are risk-averse.
A high degree of trust can mitigate all four types of reform obstacles. The problem of
insufficient information is less relevant in high-trust societies because, as was described
above, the level of information attained by individuals is higher than in low-trust societies.
Moreover, politicians face less problems in promoting there reform policies if individuals
trust them. Conversely, if government reputation is bad, it is difficult for politicians to
convince people about the positive impact of policy reforms according to expert views.
Clases and Wehner (2005) show that, once people have learned to distrust government,
new governmental proposals are evaluated accordingly. Furthermore, a high degree of
trust enhances cooperation among different groups in society and can thus help to over-
come a war of attrition. Possible compensation promises are more credible in high-trust
societies, such that policy changes are easier to implement, even when some individuals
are worse off. Additionally, the connection of trust and social behavior mentioned above
might lead to acceptance of reforms even among people who suffer (small) losses from
the policy change, because they are willing to accept those losses in order to improve the
overall situation. Finally, it is evident that reforms with uncertain distributional conse-
quences are easier to implement in a high-trust environment, since compensation promises
are more credible.
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Consequently, the conjecture that trust is an important prerequisite for structural reforms
is supported by theory. Provided this general analysis, what relationship between trust
and institutional reforms do we expect in the different policy fields? Since our reform
measure is the first difference of Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World indi-
cator (EFI) we refine our arguments along the policy dimensions included in that reform
proxy. The overall indicator is constructed from five subindicators.
The size of government indicator (EFI1) measures to what extend resources in the econ-
omy are allocated through a centralized political process rather then through decentralized
markets. In high trust societies, the degree of social cohesion is expected to be high which
in turn fosters voluntary exchange through markets. Thus, centralized decision-making
can be substituted with individual choices in decentralized mechanisms. We therefore
expect that societies with a high degree of trust will be better able to reform the public
sector by cutting back the size of government controlling for the initial level of govern-
mental activity in the economy.
Legal structure and security of property rights (EFI2) asks whether a respected legal
framework exists that enables people and organizations to challenge the legality of ac-
tions taken by their fellows. One could argue that such devices are redundant in high
trust societies, since trusting individuals would not exploit each other. Yet we expect
that trust exactly is the reason that legal frameworks for protection against coercion can
evolve, since such devices do not interfere with the actions taken by the majority of peo-
ple in society but protects them against actions which are generally agreed to be illegal.
Hence, we expect trust to be beneficial for reforms of the legal system.
The sound money indicator (EFI3) refers to the stability and predictability of the value
of money. It can be expected that high trust facilitates the stability of the monetary
system. However, most studies argue that monetary stability depends to a great extend
on economic conditions and the political economy of central banks. We thus expect that
trust has no direct observable effect on the sound money indicator.
Freedom to trade internationally (EFI4) captures each countries openness to trade. Be-
cause trust, following the argument with regard to the size of government indicator, is
conducive for trade and voluntary exchange, a positive relationship is expected. Yet, in-
ternational trade needs to be separated from exchange within a society, since it potentially
includes trade with low trust countries or countries with different regulatory settings. This
may induce restrictions on international trade even in high trust countries for matters of
reciprocity. The net effect is expected to be unclear.
Lastly, a positive effect is expected for regulation of credit, labor and business regulations
(EFI5). Especially in labor market and business regulations, trust is viewed as a necessary
condition to induce agreements at the individual level between bargaining parties. Such
agreements account for the specific circumstances of each party involved in the trade and
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Reform area Expected effect Motivation
∆EFI1 positive high social cohesion induced by trust fosters
Size of government voluntary exchange and reduces allocation of
goods through centralized entities
∆EFI2 positive common interest to establish a respected legal
Legal structure framework which ensures protection against
actions the society has agreed upon to be
illegal
∆EFI3 neutral primarly influenced by economic conditions and
Sound money the political economy of the central bank
∆EFI4 positive/ trust facilitates cross border voluntary exchange,
Freedom to trade negative yet large heterogeneity in trade partners may
(empirically) diffuse the effect
∆EFI5 positive trust helps to achieve generally desirable
Regulation of credit, contracts at the individual level, which make
labor, and business regulations on a higher level redundant
Table 1: Hypotheses regarding the relationship between trust and reforms
hence are generally desirable. Individual contracts then make regulations at a higher level
redundant. An overview of all hypotheses regarding the relationship between trust and
reforms can be found in table 1.
3.2 How to measure trust?
Since trust influences not only institutional changes but also a wide range of other eco-
nomic and political phenomena, the question of how to measure it is of particular interest.
Traditionally, this is done by attitudinal survey questions like the World Values Survey
(WVS) or the General Social Survey (GSS) which typically contain questions like ”Gen-
erally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be
very careful in dealing with people?”. Even though widely used, some studies doubt that
attitudinal questions are the appropriate trust measure. Glaeser et al. (2000) for example
raise the question whether they predict trusting actions in games. Indeed experimental
economists found that this is not always the case, leaving the questions whether the use
of such questions to make inferences about the level of trust in a society is justified. The
crucial point here is that survey questions yield attitudinal measures, whereas economic
games produce behavioral measures and it is not clear if and under which conditions both
are consistent. Yet recent studies (Capra et al. 2008) find that both measures are con-
sistent when one controls for other-regarding preferences. To put it precisely, attitudinal
trust measures predict trustworthiness in games but not necessarily trusting actions. Yet
if one separates trust from other-regarding motives like altruism and reciprocity (Cox
2004), it turns out that attitudinal measures are good predictors for trusting actions in
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games. Based on this findings, we can be reasonably confident that the WVS trust mea-
sure appropriately captures the aspects of social trust which are relevant for our study.
3.3 Empirical Evidence
We test the hypotheses developed above by investigating the effect of trust on institutional
changes. As already noted, the first difference of Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of
the World Indicator serves as our reform measure. All EFI indicators take on values
between 0 and 10 and are currently available until 2005. We define reforms as (positive)
changes in the EFI measures. Since we expect the relation between trust and institu-
tional reforms to be a long run one, we construct the reform measure accordingly and
take the first difference over ten years for each EFI subindicator. We then construct a
trust measure (TRUST) from the WVS2 by averaging the response to the trust question
of each participant for each country and rescaling the measure such that it takes on values
between 0 (low trust) and 1 (high trust). In our first estimation, we use the trust value
from 1995 for each country and the EFI first difference from 1995 to 2005.
Note that we measure trust prior to the potential reform period in order to deal with
causality issues. Even though we do not rule out that causality runs also in the direction
from reforms to trust, we thus assure that reverse causality does not have an impact on
our estimation.
Several control variables are included in the estimation. To take account for the initial
institutional situation in each country, we include the start level of the respective EFI
indicator. The log of the GDP per Capita (GDP) serves as proxy for the state of develop-
ment. We include a measure for the state of economic, social and political globalization
(GLOBALIZATION) from Dreher (2006) and the Herfindahl index of legislature (HER-
FLEGISLATURE) as a proxy for political competition (Beck et al., 2001). Moreover, we
include a dummy variable for postcommunist countries (POSTCOMMUNIST). In con-
trast to most other studies, we do not include a crises measure. In line with Haggard
and Williamson (1994), who argue that ”Crises have the effect of shocking countries out
of traditional policy patterns”, we assume that crises are short run phenomena which
cause eruptive political changes that are not adequately captured by our long run reform
measure. Summary statistics on the variables are contained in table 6 in the appendix.
2For this study, the following data source was used: European Values Study Group and World Values
Survey Association (2006). European and World Values surveys four-wave integrated data file, 1981-2004,
v.20060423, 2006.
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dependent variable
independent ∆EFI95−05 ∆EFI1,95−05 ∆EFI2,95−05 ∆EFI3,95−05 ∆EFI4,95−05 ∆EFI5,95−05
variables Total Index Government Legal Sound Trade Regulation
Structure Money
EFI95 -0.439*** -0.342*** -0.474*** -0.738*** -0.589*** -0.491***
(0.104) (0.095) (0.138) (0.084) (0.063) (0.085)
GDP 0.145 -0.257 0.567* 0.451** -0.266* 0.442**
per Capita (0.112) (0.259) (0.305) (0.220) (0.145) (0.194)
Globalization -0.006 0.002 -0.003 -0.002 0.019*** -0.017*
(0.006) (0.012) (0.013) (0.011) (0.006) (0.009)
Herfindahl -0.201 -0.274 -0.724 0.639 0.516 -0.259
Legislature (0.323) (0.782) (0.578) (0.764) (0.465) (0.641)
Postcommunist 0.842*** 0.888** 0.096 0.957** 0.475*** 1.093***
(0.240) (0.417) (0.261) (0.444) (0.161) (0.245)
Trust 1.044** 2.179* 2.450*** 0.085 0.193 2.144***
(0.498) (1.161) (0.786) (1.192) (0.636) (0.725)
Intercept 2.083*** 4.062* -2.283 2.402 5.123*** -0.161
(0.771) (2.148) (2.202) (1.907) (1.058) (1.422)
R2 0.783 0.609 0.337 0.876 0.651 0.732
N [54] [54] [54] [54] [54] [54]
Notes: Ordinary least-squares regressions. White (1980) corrected standard errors are given in
parentheses underneath. Number of observations is given in brackets.
*/**/*** Statistically significant at the 10%/5%/1%-level
Table 2: OLS estimation of specification 1
The following equation serves as our benchmark specification:
∆EFIi,1995−2005 =α + β1 ∗ EFIi,1995 + β2 ∗GDPi,1995
+ β3 ∗GLOBALIZATIONi,1995
+ β4 ∗HERFLEGISLATUREi,1995 + β5 ∗ TRUSTi,1995
+ β6 ∗ POSTCOMMUNISTi,1995 + i,1995.
(1)
We use OLS with White (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors to estimate
the above equation3.
Results of the first estimation are presented in table 2. Our main result is that trust has
a significantly positive effect on the total EFI indicator, the size of government subindi-
cator, the legal structure subindicator and the regulation subindicator. The coefficient of
trust on the sound money and trade indicators are positive though not significant. These
outcomes support our hypothesis that trust is an important condition for institutional
reforms in various fields. Another robust result is that the initial institutional situation
matters. Countries with a low initial EFI level show on average a significantly higher pos-
itive EFI change over the subsequent years. With respect to the globalization variable, we
observe that countries with a higher state of economic, social and political globalization
3Note that data availability imposes a restricition on possible estimation techniques. The technique
we use is similiar in design as the one used by Barro (1991) to study growth in a cross-section of countries.
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continue to undertake reforms with respect to trade. The reverse relationship holds with
regard to deregulation. We find that the globalization measure is negatively correlated
with deregulation. The Herfindahl index of political competition has a negative sign in
most specification, that is, a higher degree of political competition (a lower value of the
Herfindahl index) is on average conducive for reforms. However, the coefficient is not
significant. Finally, as expected postcommunist countries implement more comprehensive
policy reforms in almost every field in this observation period.
A first test of stability of our results is to apply the above specification to another time
period. Instead of the last available trust observation from 1995 we use the first avail-
able observation from the first wave of the WVS (years 1981 to 1983) and changes of the
EFI indicator from 1980 to 1990. Even though only 20 trust observations are available
from this early survey, we expect that the pattern remains stable and coefficients on the
trust values are at least positive. The results are contained in table 7 in the appendix.
Trust again has a significantly positive effect on the total EFI indicator and the regulation
subindicator. The impact on government size and legal structure is again positive, how-
ever not significant over this time period. With regard to the control variables, we make
the same observations as before. Noteworthy is that political competition has a stronger
positive impact on the total reform indicator in this time period compared to the later
one.
In order to check sensitivity of the results with respect to outliers, we conduce a least
trimmed squares (LTS) regression analysis. This method was also used by Bengtsson et
al. (2005) to check robustness of results in trust and growth studies and was pioneered
by Rousseeuw (1984). A useful property is that LTS can handle several jointly influential
outliers. Essentially, the method identifies the observations which result in the best fit
and classifies outliers as observations with large residuals. This is done by first identifying
the subset of 75 per cent of the initial observations which minimizes the sum of squared
residuals. Thereafter, residuals of the remaining 25 per cent of observations are computed
using the fitted values from the first stage regression. All observations with standarized
residual above around 2.5 are classified as outliers. Finally, reweighted least squares giving
outliers weight 0 and other observations weight 1 is applied. We adapt an algorithm by
Verboven and Hubert (2005) to implement the LTS and reweighted LS regression in our
framework. Results are contained in table 3. We find that our results are generally stable
with regard to this alternative regression method meaning that all trust coefficients which
were significant in the robust OLS regressions remain significant, with the exception of
the coefficient in the EFI size of government regression.
As a final robustness test, we construct a binary variable defining reform events and
estimate a probit model for the period from 1995 to 2005. A relative reform definition
is applied, which sets a threshold such that around one third of the observations are re-
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dependent variable
independent ∆EFI95−05 ∆EFI1,95−05 ∆EFI2,95−05 ∆EFI3,95−05 ∆EFI4,95−05 ∆EFI5,95−05
variables Total Index Government Legal Sound Trade Regulation
Structure Money
EFI95 -0.377*** -0.342*** -0.521*** -0.795*** -0.587*** -0.426***
(0.072) (0.095) (0.115) (0.061) (0.076) (0.086)
GDP 0.140 -0.259 0.576** 0.410 -0.172 0.401**
per Capita (0.119) (0.269) (0.277) (0.267) (0.169) (0.169)
Globalization -0.005 0.002 -0.001 0.011 0.018** -0.013
(0.006) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.008) (0.008)
Herfindahl -0.030 -0.065 -0.657 1.187 0.309 -0.095
Legislature (0.375) (0.855) (0.790) (0.764) (0.685) (0.536)
Postcommunist 0.947*** 0.799* -0.055 0.527 0.393** 1.118***
(0.165) (0.406) (0.280) (0.368) (0.181) (0.222)
Trust 0.789* 1.696 2.247** -1.115 -0.331 1.745***
(0.451) (1.069) (0.934) (1.012) (0.642) (0.627)
Intercept 1.702* 4.261* -2.162 2.749 4.543*** -0.341
(0.866) (2.278) (1.977) (1.976) (1.225) (1.261)
R2 0.849 0.597 0.381 0.913 0.658 0.759
N [49] [51] [47] [45] [48] [50]
Notes: Least trimmed squares regression. Standard errors are given in parentheses underneath.
Number of observations is given in brackets.
*/**/*** Statistically significant at the 10%/5%/1%-level
Table 3: LTS estimation of specification 1
form events (encoded with 1) and two thirds are not (encoded with 0). Earlier results
are confirmed with regard to the EFI government size and EFI legal structure indicators.
However, the Trust coefficient in the specifications with the overall EFI indicator and the
EFI regulation indicator are not significant anymore. This may be due to the fact that
discretizing the endogenous variable leaves us with less information than before and may
capture the effect of trust on institutional changes not accurately.
The robustness tests indicate that trust heavily influences institutional changes in the
legal system. The result is particularly strong in the 1995-2005 observation period. In
decomposing the EFI legal system subindicator, we find that trust drives the impartial
courts and the integrity of the legal system measures, but not the judicial independence,
protection of property rights and legal enforcement of contracts indicators. The impartial
courts measure captures whether a trusted legal framework exists that enables private
entities to challenge the legality of government actions or regulations. The EFI integrity
of the legal system measure is based on the law and order indicator of the International
County Risk Guide and therefore contains again an impartial courts component (law) and
a popular observance of the law component (order). Our empirical findings thus suggest
that trust fosters the evolution of institutions which give people the opportunity to be
responsive to governmental activity through a respected legal framework.
Another robust result is that trust fosters deregulation. We again decompose the respec-
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tive EFI subindicator and find that the effect is particularly strong on deregulations in
the labor market and, to a somewhat lesser extend, on deregulation of private businesses.
Yet trust has no clear effect on credit market regulations, however, we observe that trust
foster private sector credit, which is a submeasure of the credit market indicator.
The finding that trust decreases governmental involvement in the private economy through
government enterprises, taxes, transfers and subsidies turns out to be reliable in the ob-
servation period from 1995 to 2005, but not in the earlier period. Moreover, we observe
that the effect of trust on the deterioration of government activity through government
enterprises is stronger than on taxes, subsidies and the like.
Finally, the empirical analyses suggests that trust has no predictable impact on issues
related to international trade and the monetary system.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we studied the effect of social trust on institutional reforms in a cross-
section of countries. We found that the impact of trust is quite different with respect to
the policy field under consideration. A very strong result is that trust heavily facilitates
institutional changes in the legal system. Moreover, it turns out that high trust accelerates
the reduction of regulations and leads to a lower size of government measured by taxes,
expenditures, and government enterprises. Beyond, our estimations reveal that trust has
no predictable impact on the speed of deregulation with regard to international trade and
moreover does not influence the monetary system. We conduced several robustness test,
both concerning the time period under consideration and the model specification. Most
of our results survived these tests and turned out to be stable.
Summing up, our theoretical reasoning and this first explicit test for a link between trust
and reforms support the view that trust is conducive for reforms. The increasing alienation
between citizens and politicians in many industrial countries thus poses a serious problem
for these countries’ ability to cope with challenges for example from demographic change
or increasing factor mobility.
However, there is need for further research. Complementary to approaches based on
macro data disaggregated data on a micro-level should be used to investigate some of the
mentioned channels from trust to reform acceptance in isolation. More attention should
also be paid to the reversed causality and the dynamics emerging from the interplay
between the level of trust and reform processes. The extent of this two-way-causality
decides whether a reform push may be self-accelerating (through increasing trust) or not.
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A Appendix
Argentina Denmark Latvia Russia
Australia Estonia Lithuania Slovakia
Austria Finland Malta Slovenia
Bangladesh France Mexico South Africa
Belgium Germany Netherlands Spain
Bolivia Great Britain Norway Sweden
Brazil Guatemala Panama Switzerland
Bulgaria Honduras Paraguay Turkey
Canada Hungary Peru Ukraine
Chile Iceland Philippines United States
China India Poland Uruguay
Colombia Ireland Portugal Venezuela
Croatia Italy Republic of Korea
Czech Republic Japan Romania
Table 4: Countries included in the estimation, period 1995 to 2005
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Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
EFI total index 6.277 1.257 3.40 8.30
∆EFI total index 0.720 0.867 -1.30 2.60
EFI1 Government 5.249 1.843 1.75 9.12
∆EFI1 Government 0.759 1.228 -2.20 3.28
EFI2 Legal Structure 6.597 1.743 2.85 9.28
∆EFI2 Legal Structure 0.056 0.820 -1.55 2.18
EFI3 Sound Money 6.710 3.052 0 9.83
∆EFI3 Sound Money 1.932 2.485 -1.13 7.56
EFI4 Trade 7.138 1.099 3.16 8.61
∆EFI4 Trade -0.030 0.790 -1.42 2.30
EFI5 Regulation 5.851 1.178 3.18 8.30
∆EFI5 Regulation 0.790 1.032 -1.84 3.19
Trust 0.287 0.141 0.04 0.65
GDP per Capita (log) 9.145 0.818 6.85 10.29
Globalization 59.927 16.811 23.13 91.01
Herfindahl Legislature 0.320 0.145 0.08 1
Postcommunist 0.211 0.411 0 1
Table 6: Summary Statistics
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dependent variable
independent ∆EFI80−90 ∆EFI1,80−90 ∆EFI2,80−90 ∆EFI3,80−90 ∆EFI4,80−90 ∆EFI5,80−90
variables Total Index Government Legal Sound Trade Regulation
Structure Money
EFI80 -0.312*** 0.306* -0.770*** -0.405* -0.172 -0.207*
(0.079) (0.155) (0.084) (0.190) (0.170) (0.109)
GDP 0.487** 0.211 1.617*** 1.577** -0.318 -0.047
per Capita (0.197) (0.310) (0.275) (0.566) (0.232) (0.195)
Globalization -0.005 0.024 0.010 -0.014 -0.005 -0.001
(0.005) (0.014) (0.007) (0.015) (0.012) (0.005)
Herfindahl -0.539** -0.238 -0.875 -3.215*** -0.602 0.409
Legislature (0.227) (0.971) (0.692) (1.041) (0.644) (0.282)
Trust 1.080* 0.376 0.564 -0.561 2.338* 1.679**
(0.535) (0.841) (0.528) (2.219) (1.180) (0.740)
Intercept -2.091 -4.403 -9.883*** -8.814* 4.133** 0.933
(1.516) (3.466) (2.066) (4.709) (1.917) (1.345)
R2 0.637 0.262 0.9122 0.595 0.398 0.424
N [20] [20] [18] [20] [20] [20]
Notes: Ordinary least-squares regressions. White (1980) corrected standard errors are given in
parentheses underneath. Number of observations is given in brackets.
*/**/*** Statistically significant at the 10%/5%/1%-level
Table 7: Robustness test of specification 1
dependent variable
independent Reform95−05 Reform95−05 Reform95−05 Reform95−05 Reform95−05 Reform95−05
variables Total Index Government Legal Sound Trade Regulation
Structure Money
EFI95 -0.271** -0.234*** -0.226** -0.221** -0.434*** -0.017**
(0.124) (0.086) (0.093) (0.130) (0.147) (0.060)
GDP 0.039 -0.168 0.043 0.171 -0.105 -0.001
per Capita (0.184) (0.214) (0.180) (0.363) (0.177) (0.006)
Globalization -0.008 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 0.005 0.001
(0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.018) (0.009) (0.001)
Herfindahl -0.200 2.210* -0.421 -0.204 0.205 -0.055
Legislature (0.679) (1.188) (0.581) (0.874) (0.551) (0.190)
Postcom- 0.430 0.534 0.278 0.588 0.269 0.199
munist (0.239) (0.269) (0.193) (0.357) (0.236) (0.383)
Trust 1.077 2.352** 1.778** 0.603 0.391 0.055
(0.748) (1.016) (0.759) (1.305) (0.721) (0.192)
Pseudo R2 0.405 0.493 0.252 0.790 0.551 0.838
N [54] [54] [54] [54] [54] [54]
Notes: Probit regressions. Reported are marginal effects. Standard errors are given in parentheses under-
neath. Number of observations is given in brackets.
*/**/*** Statistically significant at the 10%/5%/1%-level
Table 8: Probit regression of specification 1
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